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Abstract
In this paper, I merge two theories – theory of “passionate individuals” by Gumilev
[2009(1989)] and Memetics by Dawkins [1976] – to develop a formal growth theory that
states that societies become more developed when their members have more intrinsic
motivation to solve problems of social importance (i.e. make “cultural contributions”).
Individuals derive utility from genetic fitness (i.e. the number of surviving children)
as well as from cultural fitness, defined as the amount of appreciation (“honor”) of
one’s cultural contribution by future generations. To make a cultural contribution, one
must study/honor cultural contributions of the past, which leads to multiple steady
states. In the survival steady state, individuals expect that no one in the future will
be interested in their cultural contribution, which makes them allocate all energy onto
maximization of genetic fitness and care little about cultural contributions of the past.
In the passionate steady state, individuals expect high appreciation of their cultural
contribution and thus spend a lot of energy onto making such a contribution, which
makes them highly appreciate cultural contributions of the past. Empirical implications
of theory are also discussed.
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growth
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A monument, unforged, I for myself erected.
A common path to it will not be ever lost,
And its unheedful head reigns higher than
respected,
The known Alexandrian Post.
I shall not die a whole, but in the tokened lyre
My soul will outlive my flesh and won’t decay.
I will be honored till in underlunar sphere
Lives my like who has much to say.
Alexander Pushkin, Exegi Monumentum.
Translation by Boris Leyvi
1 Introduction
There are two major theoretical paradigms of human lifetime objectives. In Economics, it
is typically assumed that humans maximize a private-consumption-based utility function;
in some applications, consumption of children is included [Becker et al., 1990], while in
others, humans are concerned not only about the absolute level of consumption but also
about relative to that of one’s contemporaries [Robson, 1992]. In theoretical biology, it
is assumed that humans, along with all other living organisms, should be concerned about
their reproductive success which is (approximately) equal to the number of surviving children
and grandchildren. At the level of the household, the two paradigms produce very similar
predictions about behavior.
Yet, many individuals who have made a major impact on the development of their so-
cieties do not seem to have followed any of the two paradigms. What was the motivation
of Peter the Great of Russia? He was certainly not concerned about genetic fitness, as he
imprisoned his own son who opposed Peter’s methods of governance. What was the mo-
tivation of the authors of the American Declaration of Independence? Upon signing, one
of the coauthors, Benjamin Franklin, said to the others [Malone, 1975]: “we must indeed
all hang together, or most assuredly we shall all hang separately”, hence the authors were
perfectly aware that their effort to change the course of history reduces their own life ex-
pectancy without adding anything to wealth or genetic success. What was the motivation
of the members of the Decembrist movement who attempted to turn the Russian monarchy
into the republic? They were some of the most respected and prosperous members of the
2
society, and could hardly enjoy any additional economic benefits out of their life-threatening
effort. What was the motivation of Martin Luther King, the American civil rights activist?
His discounted sum of lifetime consumption could have been higher had he not have a dream.
These, and many other, individuals seem to have made a large social impact by changing,
or attempting to change, the social order because making such an impact was their ultimate
goal rather than a method of achieving other goals; the traditional consumption- and genetic-
based incentives seem to have played a limited role in their decision making process.
On the other hand, members of the societies with inefficient “underdeveloped” social
orders are often described as following consumption-based or genetic-based incentives too
closely. Banfield [1958], for example, views the roots of Southern Italy underdevelopment
in the “amoral familism” of the local population, which he defines as the pursuit of the
following objective function:
Maximize the material, short-run advantage of the nuclear family; assume that
all others will do likewise.
The above definition seems to be a near-perfect match to the human objectives assumed by
the mainstream economists, as well as by theoretical biologists.1 Banfield also emphasizes
that in the society of “amoral familists”, any large-scale project of social importance is bound
to fail, as it requires large amounts of non-material and unselfish (i.e. not leading to increased
well-being of own family) motivation. Moreover, a person who undertakes a project of social
importance is likely to face distrust and scepticism of the community members (page 20):
When an interviewer explained to a young teacher [what] a “public-spirited”
person is..., the teacher said: “No one in town is animated by the desire to do
good for all of the population. Even if sometimes there is someone apparently
animated by this desire, in reality he is interested in his own welfare and he does
his own business.”
Tabellini [2008] is a recent attempt to formalize the dichotomy between “amoral familists”
and prosocial behavior, with the latter leading to higher wealth.
Another account of the fact that people in less developed societies are more inclined to
follow the objectives prescribed by theoretical biology is Caldwell and Caldwell [1987]. In
their study of the causes of very high fertility in Sub-Saharan Africa, which is viewed to be
one of the main causes of poverty in the region, the authors discover that parents choose to
1The match would be perfect is the term “short-run” was removed
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have as many children as they can because family extinction is the worst religious fear that
they have, and that even four or five children are believed to be insufficient to guarantee
survival of the family. These beliefs, therefore, are shaped to fit the standard theoretical-
biology objective of maximizing one’s genetic success; citizens of the modern highly developed
societies, on the other hand, especially those mentioned earlier in this paper, seem to pursue
or have pursued very different objectives.
In this paper, I propose a formal growth theory that states that societies become more
economically developed when their members depart from their biological instincts of maxi-
mizing genetic success, and when they invest their time and effort into solving problems that
have social value, but do not necessarily lead to own genetic success. Much of the intuition
and terminology of the proposed theory is borrowed from a popular among Russian schol-
ars theory of passionate individuals by the historian Lev Gumilev [Gumilev, 2009(1989)],
relevant parts of which are described in the paragraphs that follow.
1.1 Gumilev’s theory of passionate individuals
Gumilev stated that individuals may be different in the extent to which they are passionate,
that is, in the amount of their intrinsic motivation of achieving goals of social importance.
Gumilev has proposed several levels of passionate behavior, with the highest being the will-
ingness to achieve a goal even at the cost of one’s life and/or lives of other people; as examples
of such behavior, he proposes Alexander the Great and Jeanne d’Arc who seemingly were
not particularly concerned about own biological well-being. The lowest level of passionate
behavior, or “zero” level, according to Gumilev, is the level of individuals who fully accom-
modate to the existing environment and show no effort to improve it; the “amoral familism”
described by Banfield [1958] is a good illustration.
Gumilev states that the proportion of individuals in a particular society showing passion-
ate effort may differ considerably, both across societies and over time. He also emphasizes
that the amount of passionate effort in a particular society may increase considerably over
short periods of time and for no apparent reason, which he refers to as the passionate push.2
The passionate push leads to major changes in the political and/or religious institutions of
the respective societies; it can also lead to long-distance migrations and military conquests.
The rapid widespread settlement of the Slavs in the Eastern Europe, Arabic conquests in
the 7th and 8th centuries, the empire of the Huns in the 4th century – all these serve as
2Gumilev also stressed that the passionate push often occurs in several societies simultaneously; I do not
pursue this idea in my research
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examples of Gumilev’s passionate push. All these are also examples of rapid increases in
the degree of cooperation and coordination between people, leading to improvements in the
levels of the social development.
The idea of the passionate push seems to be closely related, both in its labeling and
content, to the theory of the big push originally proposed by Rosenstein-Rodan [1943] and
formalized by [Murphy et al., 1989]. According to the theory, an economic system may rest
in two self-sustainable equilibria – less efficient “traditional ” and a more efficient “modern”;
a considerable external effort is required to move the system from one equilibrium to another.
A logical extension of this intuition is that observed changes in the economic system may be
rare but large and long-lasting, which is also true about Gumilev’s intuition of the “passionate
push”. In the formal theory outlined below, I borrow the intuition of multiple equilibria to
model Gumilev’s insights about the roots of development and underdevelopment.
Having established that passionate individuals do not follow conventional genetic- or
consumption-based incentives, for a formal theory of passionate behavior, we need to make
credible assumptions about their objectives. Gumilev only mentions that the modes of
the passionate behavior may be different and may include the desire for power, desire for
glory, vanity, greed, etc. Thus, Gumilev’s own insights about the microfoundations of the
passionate behavior are somewhat vague; for a more “rigorous” formulation, I refer to another
theory, which has been seemingly developed independently from that of Gumilev’s, but which
has many overlappings.
1.2 Memetics and the microfoundations of passionate behavior
In the Chapter 11 of his book, Dawkins [1976] introduces the concept of the meme, or a
“virus of the mind”, which may be passed from one human brain to another, much like
genes are copied from one living organism to the next. Blackmore [2000] argues that the
memes may alter the behavior of their human hosts in such a way that humans spread their
memes (or maximize their “memetic success”) instead of maximization of genetic success.
As an example of “memetic” behavior, Dawkins [1976] mentions Socrates who insisted on
his philosophic views even at the cost of his life. As Dawkins states, “Socrates may or may
not have a gene or two alive in the world today, ... [but his memes] are still going strong”.
In other words, Socrates’ decision to choose death over life was rational if he derived utility
from the expectation that his name will be honored more than two millenia later.
The above story seems to be a close match with the Gumilev’s story of passionate individ-
uals; the behavior of Socrates fits well into the Gumilev’s definition of passionate behavior.
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On the other hand, Gumilev’s examples of passionate behavior – Alexander the Great and
Jeanne d’Arc – could be equally used by Dawkins to motivate his theory.
Neither Dawkins nor his followers discussed the implications of their theory to Devel-
opment Economics. It should be noted, however, that Dawkins’s motivating example —
Socrates — lived in the most developed, for its time, society in the world. Hence, the two
theories are quite well-aligned again.
Memetics was criticized for lack of empirical evidence of the existence of the “viruses of
the mind”; for this reason, it was not recognized as a science. But, as elaborated above, its
intuition may be useful in the analysis of the passionate behavior. In the formal analysis that
follows, I borrow “memetic” intuition to model human objectives. To avoid criticisms of the
“pure” memetics, I do not claim the existence of the memes and assume that one’s cultural
success, along with genetic success, enters the objective function of humans themselves. A
related theory is developed by Bisin and Verdier [2001] who assume that parents derive
utility from their cultural traits being absorbed by children.
1.3 History versus expectations
In dynamic models with multiple steady states, there are two forces that drive the formation
of such steady states. One is history – i.e. an economy that was in a “bad” state yesterday
has inherited some characteristics that drive the economy into the bad state today; an
economy that started in a good state inherits other characteristics that enable it to remain
in a good state. The story of expectations is relevant when agents’ well-being depends on
future decisions (those of their successors, or those of their contemporaries in the future
periods); if agents expect that future decisions will be “bad”, they undertake bad decisions
today, which makes expectations self-fulfilling. Krugman [1991] is an excellent discussion of
the dichotomy.
Which of the two – history or expectations – is relevant for an explanation of the multiple
steady states of passionate behavior? Dawkins’ explanation of the behavior of Socrates points
to the expectations story: he behaved the way he behaved because he correctly expected
that his memes will be “going strong” for a long time. An additional motivation comes from
another case study of a passionate behavior, namely Alexander Pushkin’s poem used as the
epigraph to this paper. The last two lines state “I will be honored till in underlunar sphere
lives my like who has much to say”, in other words Pushkin was motivated to write his
passionate poems by the correct expectation that there will be other poets in the future who
will admire Pushkin’s work. Hence, in the formal model that follows we pursue the story of
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self-fulfilling expectations.
2 Some passionate algebra
2.1 Setup
Consider an infinite-time-horizon dynamic environment, in which each of the discrete gen-
erations is populated by a continuum of individuals. Individuals live for one period of time;
the set of individuals of a generation t is labeled as Gt. Although it will be assumed that
each individual is concerned about the number of surviving offspring, endogenizing the pop-
ulation size is not the goal of this paper. Hence, we assume that the mass of individuals
within each generation is unity (e.g. it can be constrained by the amount of time-invariant
resources such as land).
Individuals are endowed with T units of time, which they divide between two types of
activities: passionate effort,3 labeled e(j) for individual j ∈ Gt, and survival effort T −
e(j). For the purposes of this paper, passionate effort can be defined as the effort to solve
problems of social importance without the aim to improve material well-being of oneself
and one’s relatives. Conducting research (especially by those who’s income is fixed), writing
poems, making inventions, volunteering, conducting political reforms, and leading armies
could serve as examples of passionate effort. The survival effort is the effort to solve problems
of family importance, such as procuring food, wealth, and shelter for oneself and one’s family.
Organizing a public fund is an example of passionate effort; stripping from a public fund is
an example of survival effort.
The two types of effort result in two types of output. The passionate effort results in the
cultural contribution c(j), measured in terms of the number of research articles or poems
written, inventions or political reforms made; in the language of Alexander Pushkin, c(j) is
the height of the “unforged monument to oneself”. The survival effort results in the biological
energy output b(j), which is the total amount of energy allocated onto well-being of one’s
family.
One unit of survival effort produces At units of biological energy output, where At is the
total factor productivity at time t; hence, b(j) ≡ At(T − e(j)). The total factor productivity
3Gumilev himself used the term “passionarnoye napryazhenie” (see p.68 of his book), which is a close
match to “passionate effort”.
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is assumed to be equal to the integral of all cultural impacts of the past:
At ≡ c0 +
t−1∑
n=1
∫
i∈Gn
c(i)di (1)
where c0 > 0 is “pre-existing” stock of culture at the beginning of the first period. The pro-
duction function of the cultural output is more complex and requires acquisition of knowledge
about cultural outputs of past generations. For example, Alexander Pushkin, prior to writ-
ing his passionate poem, had to learn the ancient Roman poetry in general and Horace in
particular. For mathematical tractability, I assume that studying cultural contributions of
the past and production of own cultural contribution occur simultaneously:4
c(j)(j∈Gt) ≡
(
t−1∑
n=1
∫
i∈Gn
c(i)βy(i, j)αdi+ cβ0y(0, j)
α
) 1
β
(2)
where y(i, j) is the intensity of learning of person j from i (e.g. the extent to which Pushkin
has studied the art of Horace), α ∈ (0, 1) and β ∈ (0, 1) are the parameters that govern
the extent to which cultural outputs of the past can be substituted between each other
while producing own cultural output. The intensity y(i, j) is the choice of j; one unit
of such learning intensity incurs a learning time cost of τ(i, j) (e.g. a lower τ means an
easier accessibility of Horace’s works for Pushkin). The time spent on studying all past
contributions must add up to the time allocated onto the passionate effort:
t−1∑
n=1
∫
i∈Gn
τ(i, j)y(i, j)di+ τ(0, j)y(0, j) ≤ e(j) (3)
Finally, we complete the model by defining the objective function of the decision makers.
It is assumed that they derive utility from a combination of genetic fitness and cultural
fitness. The genetic fitness, denoted xB, by complete analogy with theoretical biology is
the number of one’s surviving offspring. As mentioned earlier, it is assumed that the total
population is exogenous, hence, by complete analogy with theoretical biology models again,
one’s biological fitness is proportional to one’s biological energy output and is inversely
4Alternatively, one could assume Leontief production function of cultural output, with passionate effort
per se and time spent on learning about past cultural impacts being the two inputs of production
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related to the biological energy output of others:
xB(j)(j∈Gt) ≡
b(j)∫
j′∈Gt
b(j′)dj′
(4)
The cultural fitness, denoted xC , is the extent to which one’s cultural contribution has been
studied by the subsequent generations:
xC(j)(j∈Gt) ≡
∞∑
n=t+1
∫
k∈Gn
y(j, k)dk (5)
In the language of Alexander Pushkin, xC(j) may also be viewed as the amount of honor
that one has received for his/her cultural output.
Intuitively, genetic fitness is essential for one’s well-being, as the vast majority of people
have or desire to have children; cultural fitness, on the other hand, is not essential because,
as exemplified in the introduction of this paper, members of some societies seem to be
concerned only about genetic success. The most simple utility function that captures the
above intuition is the following:
U(xB(j), xC(j)) ≡ u(xB(j)) + xC(j) (6)
where u(·) satisfies the Inada conditions (increasing, concave, has infinite slope at zero).
Specifically, I choose the constant relative risk aversion function: u(x) = xγ , γ ∈ (0, 1), for
reasons that will be apparent on page 12.
2.2 Analysis
We begin the analysis by calculating the optimal learning intensities y(i, j), taking one’s
passionate effort e(j) as given. The optimal choice of j depends on how j’s cultural con-
tribution is expected to affect his cultural fitness. While there may be many equilibria in
this environment, we analyze the “focal” equilibrium in which a higher cultural contribution
means a higher cultural fitness. As is shown below, this property is recursive: if it is true for
all members of all generations succeeding t, it must be also true for all members of generation
t and all generations preceding t, for arbitrary t.
With this assumption, optimal learning intensities can be calculated by maximizing (2)
with respect to y(i, j) subject to (3). Solving a constrained optimization problem yields that
an optimal learning intensity y(i, j) is proportional to c(i)
β
1−α τ(i, j)−
1
1−α . To satisfy the time
9
constraint (3), the learning intensity must be equal to
y(i, j)(i∈Gt′ ,j∈Gt) =
e(j)
L(j)
c(i)
β
1−α τ(i, j)−
1
1−α (7)
L(j) ≡ c
β
1−α
0 τ(0, j)
−
α
1−α +
t−1∑
n=1
∫
i′∈Gn
c(i′)
β
1−α τ(i′, j)−
α
1−αdi′ (8)
The parameter L(j) is labeled as the learning environment of the individual j; it represents
the ease of access to the knowledge about the cultural contributions of the past. With a
better learning environment, a decision maker demands less of a cultural contribution of a
particular individual from the past, due to better access to the alternatives.
With these learning intensities, the maximal cultural contribution one can make is
c(j) =
(
e(j)
L(j)
)α
β
(
c
γ
1−α
0 τ(0, j)
−
α
1−α +
t−1∑
n=1
∫
i∈Gn
c(i)
γ
1−α τ(i, j)−
α
1−α
) 1
β
=
(
e(j)
L(j)
)α
β
L(j)
1
β
= e(j)
α
βL(j)
1−α
β (9)
From (7), we can also calculate the cultural fitness of a particular individual j ∈ Gt:
xC(j) = c(j)
β
1−α
∞∑
n=t+1
∫
k∈Gt+1
1
L(k)
e(k)τ(j, k)−
1
1−αdk
= e(j)
α
1−αL(j)
∞∑
n=t+1
∫
k∈Gt+1
e(K)
L(k)
τ(j, k)−
1
1−αdk (10)
while the biological fitness is
xB(j) =
At(T − e(j))
At
∫
j′∈Gt
(T − e(j′))dj′
=
T − e(j)
T −
∫
j′∈Gt
e(j′)dj′
(11)
We end up with a unidimensional optimization problem in which individuals choose their
optimal passionate effort e(j).
For mathematical tractability of the analysis that follows, we assume a specific form of
the learning costs: τ(i, j)(i∈Gn,j∈Gt) = τ
t−n, with τ > 1. Intuitively, learning about cultural
contributions of individuals from a more distant past is more difficult. Additionally, we
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introduce the following notations:
et ≡
∫
j′∈Gt
e(j′)dj′
e
α
1−α
t ≡
∫
j′∈Gt
e(j′)
α
1−αdj′
Given the assumed structure of the learning costs, the learning environments of all members
of a given generation t are the same and are denoted by Lt; (8) can be transformed into
Lt = c
β
1−α
0 τ
−t α
1−α +
t−1∑
n=1
Lne
α
1−α
nτ
−(t−n) α
1−α = c
β
1−α
0 τ
−t α
1−α
t−1∏
n=1
(
1 + e
α
1−α
n
)
(12)
The optimization problem of j ∈ Gt, given (6), (10), and (11), becomes
max
z
U(z, et, Vt) (13)
where
U(z, et, Vt) ≡ u
(
T − z
T − et
)
+ z
α
1−αVt (14)
and where Vt is the honor return to passionate effort :
Vt = V (et+1, et+2, ...; e
α
1−α
t, e
α
1−α
t+1, ...) ≡ Lt
∞∑
n=t+1
1
Ln
τ−(n−t)
1
1−α en =
∞∑
n=t+1
enτ
−(n−t)∏n−1
s=t
(
1 + e
α
1−α
s
)
=
et+1 + Vt+1
τ
(
1 + e
α
1−α
t
) (15)
Intuitively, the honor return to passionate effort is a measure of the expected intensity of
appreciation of one’s cultural contribution by the future generations. It does not depend on
the decisions of the past, which considerably simplifies the analysis.
For mathematical tractability of the analysis that follows, we constrain ourselves to the
case α = 1
2
. Note that in this case e
α
1−α
t = et, ∀t. The optimal passionate effort e(j) =
argmaxz U(z, et, Vt) can then be found from the first-order condition of (13):
Uz(e(j), et, Vt) ≡ −u
′
(
T − e(j)
T − et
)
1
T − et
+ Vt
{
= 0 , e(j) > 0
≤ 0 , e(j) = 0
(16)
The second derivative of U(z, et, Vt) with respect to z is globally negative and hence there
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exists a unique optimal passionate effort. It is positive if and only if the honor return to
such effort Vt exceeds a certain positive threshold.
Formally, the problem outlined above is the problem of finding equilibria in a game with
a continuum of players divided between an infinite number of discrete generations, in which
each player chooses his level of passionate effort. We analyze the game in two steps: first,
we fix the decisions of players from all generations except t, and calculate the best response
of a j ∈ Gt as a function of the decisions of his contemporaries; second, we use the results
of the first step to analyze the full game.
2.2.1 Best response to decisions of contemporaries
Proposition 1 Suppose α = 1
2
. Then, for any person j ∈ Gt, ∀t, when an arbitrary subset
of j’s contemporaries increases their passionate effort by an arbitrary positive amount, the
optimal passionate effort of j strictly decreases if initially positive, and remains equal to zero
if initially zero.
Proof. From (16), the optimal passionate effort of j, e(j), depends only on the mean of
the distribution of passionate efforts of his contemporaries, through two channels. First, et
affects j’s biological fitness b(j); second, it affects the honor return to j’s passionate effort Vt
by improving the learning environments of the future generations Ln, n = t+1, t+2, ... Since
the mean passionate effort increases when an arbitrary subset of Gt increases their passionate
effort by an arbitrary amount, it is sufficient to prove that j responds to increases in et by
decreasing e(j). For that, in turn, it is sufficient to show that the cross-derivative d
2U(z,et,Vt)
dzdet
is strictly negative. Recall that the utility (14) consists of two components, u
(
T−z
T−et
)
and
zV (et, et+1, ...), which we analyze separately.
∂2u
(
T−z
T−et
)
∂z∂et
= −
u′′
(
T−z
T−et
)
T−z
T−et
+ u′
(
T−z
T−et
)
(T − et)
2 < 0
∂2zV (et, et+1, ...)
∂z∂et
=
∂V (et, et+1, ...)
∂et
= −
et+1 + Vt+1
τ (1 + et)
2 < 0
The former inequality is due to the fact that u is a constant relative risk aversion function
with less-than-unity coefficient of risk aversion.
Proposition 1, combined with the symmetry of individuals within a generation, yields the
following
12
et
e(j)
T
T
et
et
Figure 1: Optimal passionate effort of j ∈ Gt as a function of mean passionate effort of
contemporaries
Corollary 1 Assuming α = 1
2
and given the strategies of the future generations e(k), ∀k ∈
Gn, ∀n > t, there exists a unique equilibrium level et of passionate effort of those in Gt.
Proof. Symmetry of the equilibrium strategies of those in Gt follows from the symmetry
of players. The fact that the equilibrium strategies are pure follows from strict concavity of
the optimization problem (13). The uniqueness of the equilibrium follows from Proposition
1.
Figure 1 illustrates the above results. Additionally, we have that in equilibrium et = et.
With these results, the equilibrium biological fitness of an individual is equal to unity, and
the best response first order condition (16) boils down to
−u′(1)
1
T − et
+ Vt
{
= 0 , et > 0
≤ 0 , et = 0
which results in a closed-form solution for et:
et =
{
T −
u′(1)
Vt
, Vt ≥
u′(1)
T
0 , Vt <
u′(1)
T
(17)
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Wt
Wt+10
survival
steady state
W ∗
W ∗
passionate
steady state
τu′(1)
T
u′(1)
T
Figure 2: Steady states in the model
2.2.2 Best response to decisions of future generations
The time path of the passionate effort is fully characterized by (17) and by the evolution of
Vt (cf.(15)):
Vt =
et+1 + Vt+1
τ (1 + et)
(18)
Define Wt ≡ et + Vt; then, substituting (17) into (18) and solving for Vt, we obtain:
Vt =
{
u′(1)
1+T
+ Wt+1
τ(1+T )
,Wt+1 ≥
τu′(1)
T
Wt+1
τ
,Wt+1 <
τu′(1)
T
Wt =
{
u′(1)
1+T
+ Wt+1
τ(1+T )
+ T − u
′(1)τ(1+T )
u′(1)τ+Wt+1
,Wt+1 ≥
τu′(1)
T
Wt+1
τ
,Wt+1 <
τu′(1)
T
(19)
The equation (19) describes the evolution of Wt, which is illustrated on Figure 2.
With the appropriate parameters of the model, there are two stable steady states. In the
first steady state, individuals exert zero passionate effort because the honor return to such
effort is zero. Since they do not exert a passionate effort, they are also not interested in
the cultural contributions of the past and allocate all of their energy onto survival of their
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households, in accordance with the standard theoretical biology models of behavior of living
organisms. For this reason, the honor return to passionate effort of their ancestors is also
zero. In this steady state, the amount of cultural output produced by each generation is
zero, hence the total factor productivity does not change over time; in other words, economic
stagnation takes place. I refer to this steady state as the survival steady state.
In the other steady state, individuals show a strictly positive passionate effort, because
they expect that there will passionate individuals in the future who will demand (“honor”)
their cultural contributions. To make a cultural contribution, individuals also have to
study/honor contributions of the past, which ensures a high honor return to passionate
effort of the previous generation. This steady state is referred to as passionate; the level of
passionate effort e∗ in such steady state can be found by solving the system of equations
e∗ + V ∗ = W ∗ and (cf.(17)) e∗ = T − u
′(1)
V ∗
for e∗ and V ∗; the parameter W ∗ in this system,
in turn, can be found by solving (cf.(19)) W ∗ = u
′(1)
1+T
+ W
∗
τ(1+T )
+ T − u
′(1)τ(1+T )
u′(1)τ+W ∗
and choosing
the larger solution.
The evolution of the total factor productivity in the passionate steady state is character-
ized by (from (1), (9), and (12)):
At = c0 + c0
(
e∗
τ
) 1
2β ∑
n=1
t− 1
(
1 + e∗
τ
)n−1
2β
= c0 + c0
(
e∗
τ
) 1
2β
(
1+e∗
τ
) t
2β − 1(
1+e∗
τ
) 1
2β − 1
(20)
The asymptotic net growth rate of the TFP is then
(
1+e∗
τ
) 1
2β − 1, which is greater than zero
for a sufficiently small learning cost τ . Hence, the passionate steady state is characterized
by economic growth.
3 The empirical content of the theory
As a measure of passionate incentives, I propose to use the survival vs. self-expression index
originally proposed by Inglehart and Baker [2000]. The index is one of the two principal
components of human values across the world, as measured by the World Values Survey.
The very labeling of the index (“survival” versus “self-expression”) seems to be a close
match to the concept of the two steady states proposed in this paper. In the survival
steady state, individuals allocate all their energy onto survival of their households, and thus
their objectives are not any different from the objectives of all living organisms, as defined
by theoretical biology. On the other hand, there is nothing like “self-expression” in the
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theoretical biology textbooks; such incentives seems to be unique to humans only, and they
seem to be related to the desire to make an impact on the minds of others. At the same
time, Dawkins [1976] emphasizes that “memetic” behavior is possible among humans only,
due to their unprecedented ability for cultural transmission. Hence, the concept of self-
expression values seems to be well-aligned with the concept of “memetic” incentives and
with the passionate steady state defined in this paper.
Moreover, many of the correlates of the survival vs. self-expression values (see table 1)
have the same genetic vs. “memetic” interpretation. People that maximize genetic fitness
must have values centered exclusively on their children; the opinion that “a woman has to
have children in order to be fulfilled” has a 83% correlation with a measure of survival values,
while “a child needs a home with both a father and a mother to grow up happily” has a
73% correlation with the same measure. A person which cares only about genetic success
should not invest any effort into improving things outside of his/her household; people with
survival values do not recycle things to protect the environment (76% correlation), do not
attend meetings or sign petitions to protect the environment (75%), when seeking a job
care only about income and safety (74%), do not take part in boycotts (56%) and oppose
sending aid to other countries (42%). For a person maximizing genetic success, his/her
degree of altruism towards other people must be proportional to the degree of proximity
of their genotypes (“inclusive fitness” hypothesis, Hamilton [1964]), hence such a person
prefers neighbors of the same ethnicity; genetic success maximizers should also be hostile
to homosexual neighbors, because such neighbors may pass their low-fertility cultural traits
onto one’s close relatives (81% correlation).
On the other hand, individuals living in a passionate steady state shift their objectives
away from family towards cultural fitness, and hence are more likely to have another attitude
to the above mentioned issues.
Survival vs. self-expression tradeoff is also strongly correlated with development. In-
glehart and Baker [2000], Table 4, show a positive and significant correlation between this
tradeoff and GDP per capita – not only in the whole sample, but also in each of eight cultural
clusters of countries identified by the authors. Whether self-expression values are the cause
or the consequence of economic development? Inglehart and Baker [2000] interpret the corre-
lation as growing income being the cause of self-expression “passionate” values, but there are
historic examples of the opposite. The Ancient Greek society did not make use of electricity
or combustion engine, and therefore must have been very poor by modern standards, but
nevertheless was (anecdotally) quite passionate and made many cultural contributions.
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Table 1: Correlation of the World Values Survey Items with the Survival/Self-Expression
Tradeoff. Source: Inglehart and Baker [2000]
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Inglehart and Welzel [2005] also study the relationship between values and democratic
institutions, and discover that
• “Self-expression values prove to be more strongly linked with democracy than any other
factor, including variables that figure prominently in the literature on democratization,
such as interpersonal trust, associational membership, and per capita GDP“ (p.4), and
• the causality flows from self-expression values to democracy rather than the other way
around (chapter 8).
In the language of this paper, these results can be interpreted as follows: a society must be
sufficiently passionate to sustain democracy, because creation and maintenance of democratic
institutions requires large amounts of passionate effort.
4 Conclusion
The growth theory of this paper can be summarized as follows: the world changes as long as
there are people that are willing to change the world, whom I label, following the historian
Lev Gumilev, as passionate individuals. Slavery in the United States was abolished not by
the invisible hand of competition between consumption maximizers, but by the passionate
effort of the society. The same force has abolished serfdom in Russia, conducted numerous
economic reforms throughout the globe, and made provisions to protect the wildlife. If Adam
Smith cared only about the wealth of his household, he would not have time for “The Wealth
of Nations”. There would be no Yosemite National Park if John Muir cared only about the
revenues of his ranch.
Underdeveloped societies, on the other hand, are underdeveloped due to lack of passionate
individuals and because the members of such societies follow primarily their genetic instinct
of maximizing their family well-being.
The paper develops a formal multiple-steady-state model of passionate behavior, and
discusses its empirical implications.
On the normative side, the theory suggests that commitments to commemorate passion-
ate efforts of the past may be growth-enhancing, as they increase the honor return to such
efforts. Freedom of speech and freedom of convention may have the same effect, as they
decrease the cost of cultural transmission between people.
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